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Abstract 
Heavily Energy Subsidized Economies, defined as having budgetary subsidies above 1.5% of 
GDP, on average in 2014 spent 4% of GDP on subsidizing energy. Resource rents permit 
administratively undemanding transfers to citizens to maintain political support. Once in place, 
benefitting groups will resist their removal, despite the resulting inefficient consumption and the 
lock-in risk caused by sustained low energy prices. Collapsing energy prices that deliver severe 
fiscal shocks combined with growing concerns over climate change damage make carefully 
designed reforms both urgent and politically more acceptable. Understanding their political logic 
suggests designing reforms that compensate the most vocal interest groups and there is evidence 
that this is increasingly recognized. The paper presents evidence on the magnitude and impacts of 
oil gas and electricity subsidies, and discusses how the electricity sector can be weaned of 
subsidies while reducing its carbon emissions. 
1. Introduction 
Typically, Heavily Energy Subsidized Economies (HESEs), defined in the next section, 
choose energy subsidies on the back of energy rents and energy exports as a way of 
passing those rents back to their citizens, and to buy public support with generous welfare 
benefits and subsidized energy. In the face of limited capacity to invest returns profitably 
locally, and perhaps lacking the confidence of the population that sovereign wealth funds 
will provide future benefits (or because the discount rate that the population applies 
exceeds the likely return to such funds) there are evident attractions in transferring at 
least some of the resource rents directly to the population.2 Once subsidies are in place, 
the groups that benefit are likely to strongly resist their removal. Social welfare theory 
argues that resource rents in excess of the costs of basic administration should ideally be 
returned as lump sum demo-grants, translated into the public finance precept that they 
should be used to finance essential public services such as health and compulsory 
education that are their practical equivalent. The kinds of reforms to tax and expenditure 
systems favoured by public economics presuppose an efficient, trusted and uncorrupt 
fiscal system that may be lacking. Once alternative forms of rent allocation are chosen 
they can be hard to change.  
                                                 
1 Paper written for The Energy Journal Special Issue on Renewables and Diversification in 
Heavily Energy Subsidized Economies. I am indebted to Jim Krane for helpful comments on an 
earlier draft. 
2 Victor (2009) sets out the political economy theory of interest groups that influence a 
government’s chances of survival. 
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Just as energy taxes are easy to collect, so energy subsidies are easy to administer, 
even if they cumulatively lead to highly inefficient patterns of consumption with the risk 
of lock-in. As rents decline and/or as energy prices fluctuate, so the HESEs suffer 
increasingly severe fiscal shocks. As international pressure to alleviate climate change 
increases, HESEs find themselves increasingly isolated and face the risk of either global 
agreements on carbon pricing, or heavy import taxes on their energy exports, which may 
be extended through border tax adjustments to their energy-intensive exports.  
Subsidy reform is considered difficult (GSI, 2010; Whitley and van der Burg, 
2015) but understanding their political logic suggests designing reforms that compensate 
the most vociferous interest groups, while it may be easier to make structural reforms 
when the resource rents have fallen and budgets are under stress (OECD, 2010). Recent 
experience in some Gulf countries has belied the earlier pessimism that removing fuel 
subsidies was almost impossible. Saudi Arabia doubled gasoline prices and trebled diesel 
prices between 2015-16, with Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar all making major price 
increases (Krane and Hung, 2016). That suggests that concepts of solidarity may allow 
the removal of other subsidies that most benefit higher income groups – and the 
electricity sector is therefore a good sector for further reform. 
This paper examines strategies to reduce subsidies to electricity and decarbonize 
that sector. HESEs that have both oil and gas, and still use oil in power generation, would 
seem to have a simple option of switching to gas, which was the main source of 
electricity decarbonisation in Britain in the 1990s. HESEs that have already switched to 
gas face a harder task, as further decarbonisation would involve supporting renewable 
electricity supply, and in some cases, CCS or even nuclear power, if costs can be 
adequately reduced. Fortunately many HESEs have high levels of insolation that makes 
solar PV increasingly attractive and recent PV price falls have reinforced that prospect. 
That makes bringing fossil-fuel generation prices up to cost reflective levels even more 
important. The first question to address is how to properly price gas in those countries for 
which gas is relatively abundant in order to measure the efficient cost. This will involve 
some discussion of carbon pricing. The next question will be the comparative social costs 
of local gas and solar PV. The final question will be how to reform the pricing of 
electricity and start subsidy reform. 
2. HESEs – definitions and characteristics 
IEA (2016) presents the latest data on energy subsidies, discussed in IEA (2015). That 
shows world-wide fossil-fuel consumption subsidies of $493 billion in 2014, “$39 billion 
down on the previous year, in part due to the drop in international energy prices, with 
subsidies to oil products representing over half of the total. Those subsidies were over 
four-times the value of subsidies to renewable energy.” Heavily Energy Subsidized 
Economies (HESEs) are defined in this paper as those countries that devoted more than 
1.5% of GDP in 2014 to explicit subsidies to energy, as defined by the IEA (2016). The 
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emphasis on explicit subsidies directs attention to their impact on the budgets of these 
countries, and massively understates the economic subsidies set out in Coady et al. (2015) 
and in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 Estimates of economic subsidies to fossil fuels, 2014, $US billions 
fuel 
pre-tax 
subsidies 
global 
warming 
air 
pollution 
foregone 
cons tax 
revenue Total shares 
Oil $267 $202 $291 $224 $984 23% 
Coal $5 $617 $1,889 $19 $2,530 60% 
Nat gas $112 $267 $56 $48 $483 11% 
Electricity $156 
  
$76 $232 5% 
Total $541 $1,086 $2,235 $367 $4,229 100% 
shares 13% 26% 53% 9% 100%   
Source: Coady et al (2015) 
Note: excludes congestion, accidents and road damage as these are properly road vehicle 
externalities and would arise even with electric vehicles. 
The difference between the two measures of subsidies lie in the failure to charge 
for environmental externalities (air pollution and climate change damage), granting 
preferential treatment (state aids) to energy producers (lower borrowing rates to state 
enterprises) and the failure to levy efficient taxes on final producers (e.g. taxing energy at 
a lower rate of Value Added Tax than almost all other commodities). This difference is 
massive, as table 1 shows. Pre-tax subsidies, the explicit subsidies that effectively come 
out of the budget or deprive the budget of revenue, amounted to $541 bn in 2014, only 
13% of the total of $4,229 bn. Note the very high social cost of air pollution from coal, 
and that air pollution costs twice the estimated global warming damage (at the assumed 
2013 carbon price of $36/tonne CO2 from US Government, 2013). 
Table 2 gives the subsidies for the 30 HESE meeting the criterion of at least 1.5% 
of GDP in pre-tax subsidies in 2014, as a share of GDP and in US$ amounts, ranking the 
countries by the share of subsidies in GDP in descending order. The penultimate line 
shows that the GDP-weighted average share of GDP subsidies to oil and gas is 3.0% and 
for all subsidies is 4%. Electricity subsidies are 1% of GDP. As we have excluded the 
other 7 less-heavily subsidized countries (i.e. less than 1.5% of GDP) that account for 
more than half the total GDP, the subsidy share for the fuller IEA sample of 37 countries 
is roughly half that of the HESEs.3  The 37 countries account for 32% of world GDP, and 
the 30 listed for 13% of the world total. The total natural resources rents in table 1 are the 
sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest 
rents as a share of GDP for 2013. 
                                                 
3 The IEA reports on 41 countries, but the data above excludes Colombia, Ghana, Taipei and 
Vietnam  
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Table 2 2014 Subsidies (% of GDP and $ bn), 2013 resource rents and gasoline prices 
Country Oil gas Elec. Total 
$US 
bill 
GDP US$ 
bn 
US$GDP/kg 
oil eq. 
Resource 
rents 2013 
gasoline price 
$/L 
Iran 9.9% 5.5% 3.9% 19.3% $78.0 $425 $5.74 29.4% $0.37 
Libya 16.1% 0.2% 1.9% 18.0% $7.4 $41 $8.27 47.0% n.a. 
Turkmenistan 7.3% 6.9% 2.3% 16.3% $7.8 $48 $2.52 32.1% $0.22 
Venezuela 10.2% 1.6% 3.4% 15.2% $31.4 $381 $6.92 26.0% $0.02 
Uzbekistan 0.8% 11.3% 2.2% 14.3% $9.0 $63 $2.90 20.2% $1.02 
Saudi Arabia 6.6% 1.1% 1.8% 9.5% $71.3 $746 $7.19 46.4% $0.16 
Algeria 6.5% 1.5% 1.4% 9.4% $20.2 $214 $10.67 28.2% $0.27 
Oman 3.7% 3.2% 1.9% 9.0% $7.0 $82 $5.55 38.8% $0.31 
Egypt 5.6% 0.6% 1.8% 8.0% $23.0 $287 $11.03 10.9% $0.88 
Bahrain 2.3% 0.0% 4.4% 6.7% $2.3 $34 $4.26 23.6% n.a. 
Bolivia 4.7% 0.6% 0.6% 5.6% $1.9 $33 $6.97 16.1% $0.70 
Ecuador 5.1% 0.0% 0.5% 5.6% $5.6 $101 $11.04 17.0% $0.60 
Iraq 4.7% 0.0% 0.9% 5.6% $12.4 $224 $10.64 42.9% $0.43 
Kuwait 2.0% 0.8% 2.3% 5.1% $8.8 $164 $7.61 59.1% $0.22 
Ukraine 0.0% 2.8% 2.1% 4.9% $6.4 $132 $3.09 9.7% $1.17 
UAE 1.2% 2.4% 0.9% 4.4% $17.6 $399 $7.97 23.7% $0.47 
Trin. & Tob. 2.2% 0.0% 1.4% 3.6% $1.0 $29 $2.09 34.4% n.a. 
Indonesia 2.2% 0.0% 0.9% 3.1% $27.7 $889 $10.78 7.6% $0.93 
Qatar 1.1% 0.8% 1.1% 3.0% $6.2 $210 $7.07 34.6% $0.23 
Pakistan 0.0% 1.8% 0.9% 2.7% $6.8 $244 $9.06 3.9% $0.94 
Argentina 0.4% 0.9% 1.2% 2.5% $13.6 $538   3.8% $1.52 
Brunei 1.9% 0.0% 0.0% 2.5% $0.4 $17 $7.65 35.1% $0.41 
Kazakhstan 1.2% 0.2% 0.2% 2.5% $5.3 $218 $4.82 31.5% $0.81 
Russia 0.0% 0.9% 1.2% 2.1% $39.6 $1,861 $4.41 18.8% $0.81 
Azerbaijan 0.4% 0.9% 0.7% 2.0% $1.5 $75 $10.79 36.4% $1.21 
Angola 1.7% 0.0% 0.2% 1.9% $2.4 $138 $11.02 35.0% $0.76 
India 1.5% 0.2% 0.2% 1.9% $38.2 $2,049 $7.79 5.9% $1.10 
El Salvador 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 1.8% $0.5 $25 $10.71 1.7% $1.12 
Bangladesh 0.1% 1.0% 0.5% 1.7% $3.1 $173 $12.71 3.4% $1.30 
Malaysia 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% $5.3 $338 $8.11 10.0% $0.68 
Total/wted av. 2.2% 0.8% 1.0% 4.0% $462 $10,175 $6.83 17.6% $0.75 
All 37 countries 1.1% 0.5% 0.5% 2.1% $493 $23,432 
   Sources: Subsidies: IEA (2016), other data: WDI (2016). 
 
Figure 1 shows the top 25 countries ranked by total $ subsidy. The top six 
countries account for 60% of the total subsidies paid by these 25 countries (58% of the 
whole sample of 37 countries). China - large country with a small subsidy share of GDP - 
ranks 10th in this group but falls outside table 2. 
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Figure 1 Total subsidies by fuel for selected countries, US$ billion, 2014 
Source: WDI (2016).  
 
Figure 2 and 3 show the expected relationship between resource endowment 
(rents as a share of GDP) and energy subsidies in total (also as a share of GDP) and the 
extent of gasoline subsidy (the price is for 2012, in which year the world average price 
was $1.41/litre and the US pump price was $0.97/litre). 
 
 
Figure 2 Energy subsidy rates increase with resource rent 
Source: WDI (2016).  
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Figure 3 Highly resource intensive economies subsidize gasoline more heavily 
Source: WDI (2016). 
Since 2013-14, oil and gas prices have fallen considerably, as figure 4 shows. As 
many of the HESE rely on resource rents for a large share of fiscal and export revenues, 
this will have had a dramatic effect on the budget and trade deficits, reducing the ability 
of these countries to maintain subsidies. 
 
Figure 4 Quarterly centred real oil and gas prices, 1997-2014 
Source: EIA, BP (2015) and World Bank (2016) deflated by US CPI. 
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If subsidies take the form of setting the domestic price of energy at an absolute 
level then the subsidy element will naturally fall with the fall in energy prices, offering 
the opportunity to ensure that local energy prices rise in line (and ideally catch up) with 
export (or import) prices. However, in many countries, Figure 3 shows that the domestic 
oil product prices are so far below export parity that this will not solve the problem 
without considerable price increases, and the Gulf States examples cited above suggests 
that once citizens appreciate the nature of the budgetary challenge they are often willing 
to accept the removal of the more visible subsidies on diesel and gasoline. Raising energy 
prices is likely to be politically more acceptable than reducing other social transfers. 
Figure 5 shows the significance of oil exports and total subsidies relative to GDP, 
showing what would have happened if the 2013 volume of exports were continued to 
2015, reflecting the impact of the price fall then. (The absolute level of oil production at 
these two prices and the level of oil subsidies are shown in Appendix Table A1.)  Clearly 
the impact on the balance of trade for some HESEs exceeded 10% of GDP, which 
represents a massive trade shock.  
 
Figure 5 Estimated value of 2013 oil exports and total subsidies as a share of GDP 
Note: Exports = production less consumption from BP (2015), valued at Brent oil prices 
for 2013 and 2015,  
* from IEA energy balance data4 as BP consumption data lacking. 
                                                 
4 At http://www.iea.org/statistics/statisticssearch/  
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2.1. Electricity subsidies and the pricing of gas for power 
Figure 6 shows that electricity intensity (kWh/$(2011) PPP per capita GDP) rises with 
the electricity subsidy as a share of GDP. The squares show that across low middle and 
high income OECD countries electricity intensity rises somewhat but by nothing like as 
much as the range displayed by HESEs, suggesting that the relationship between 
electricity intensity and subsidy is strongly affected by the subsidy rate. (The squares are 
given a notional 0.4 of 1% subsidy to avoid overlaying the y-axis. Table A2 in the 
appendix gives the relevant additional data and also the carbon intensity for these 
countries.)  
 
Figure 6 Electricity intensity increases with electricity subsidies 
Source: Appendix Table A2, IEA (2016), WDI 2016 
 
Table 3 provides additional data for the electricity sector in HESEs, ranking the 
countries by the share of electricity generated by oil, and giving the size of electricity 
subsidies as a proportion of GDP. Zero carbon electricity shares are mainly hydro but 
include wind and nuclear power, so the residual from the sum of the three fuel shares is 
the share of coal. The final two columns indicate the importance of gas in the country. 
Production is valued at German import gas prices (which in most cases represents a 
massive overstatement of the true value, as discussed below, but allows a quantitative 
comparison relative to GDP across countries of very different sizes). The final column 
gives the ratio of reserves to 2014 production (which for Iraq is misleadingly high as 
production was unusually low in 2014).  
The first point to note is that the domestic value of oil is effectively its world 
market price, but the domestic value of gas depends very much on the nature of the gas 
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and its access to export or import facilities. Associated gas can have a zero commercial 
(and negative social) value if surplus and flared, but if it can be exported or used 
domestically, its value will depend on its netback value. The value of non-associated gas 
will depend on whether it is scarce, whether it is in domestic surplus and can be exported, 
and whether exports are constrained by LNG or pipeline capacity. In these cases, if 
exports are capacity constrained and production constraints can be reasonably easily 
removed, the value of an extra unit of gas consumed locally (and specifically in 
electricity generation) is the extraction cost plus the present discounted future rent at the 
date of exhaustion. If R/P is high then this rent element could be very low. 
Krane (2015) provides useful data for the six Persian Gulf Monarchies (Saudi 
Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain, italicized in Table 2). Most started with 
associated gas, often flared and hence with zero (private) marginal value. Oman exports 
LNG and Qatar is the largest gas exporter, but domestic consumption is growing rapidly 
in Gulf countries, mainly for electricity production. Many countries fixed the price of gas 
and electricity in nominal terms when gas was surplus in the 1970s or 1980s, and have 
often not revised them or, in the case of Saudi Arabia, have reduced them. Saudi and 
Kuwaiti domestic electricity tariffs fell to less than 1 US ¢/kWh, and all six have tariffs 
for nationals less than 2 US¢/kWh (Krane, 2015, fig 10). 
Looking at the R/P ratios in table 3, one might expect the scarcity price of gas in 
seven of the top 9 countries (all except for Pakistan and El Salvador) should be low while 
their share of valuable oil use in generation is high, as are their subsidies to electricity (in 
all but one case above 1.8% of GDP, which is almost the share of value added of 
electricity in OECD countries). Assuming that they can expand gas production, removing 
any oil subsidies used in electricity generation and investing in cheap CCGTs would 
release oil for exports, and, with sensible gas pricing (at least for electricity), should be 
commercially attractive. The Saudi Electricity Company has had long-standing plans to 
reduce direct crude burn for electricity generation by more than 500,000 bbl/d by 
switching to natural gas, and has even more ambitious plans to expand solar and nuclear 
power in the next decade.5 However, rapid electricity demand growth continues to thwart 
that switch given the shortage of available gas, and the Kingdom continues to build oil-
fired capacity. 
 
 
                                                 
5 EIA at http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/country.cfm?iso=SAU 
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Table 3 Data for electricity sector, HESEs 
  subsidy/ fuel shares in generation 2013 prodn. R/P gas 
Country GDP gas oil zero-C gas/GDP 2014 
Kuwait 2.3% 37% 63% 0% 3% 109 
Saudi Arabia 1.8% 53% 47% 0% 4% 75 
Libya 1.9% 61% 39% 0% 12% 123 
Iraq 0.9% 54% 38% 8% 0% 2860 
Pakistan 0.9% 26% 37% 37% 6% 14 
El Salvador 1.8% 0% 34% 66% 0% n.a. 
Iran 3.9% 66% 26% 8% 13% 197 
Venezuela 3.4% 17% 15% 68% 3% 195 
Egypt 1.8% 77% 15% 9% 7% 38 
Argentina 1.2% 55% 14% 31% 3% 9 
Bangladesh 0.5% 83% 13% 4% 12% n.a. 
Indonesia 0.9% 24% 12% 13% 3% 39 
Algeria 1.4% 93% 7% 1% 14% 54 
Malaysia 0.0% 48% 4% 9% 7% 16 
Oman 1.9% 98% 3% 0% 12% 24 
India 0.2% 5% 2% 20% 2% n.a. 
UAE 0.9% 99% 1% 0% 5% 105 
Russia 1.2% 50% 1% 34% 11% 56 
Kazakhstan 0.2% 10% 1% 8% 3% 78 
Uzbekistan 2.2% 74% 1% 21% 33% 19 
Ukraine 2.1% 7% 0% 51% 7% 34 
Bahrain 4.4% 100% 0% 0% 14% 11 
Turkmenistan 2.3% 100% 0% 0% 44% 252 
Trin. & Tob. 1.4% 100% 0% 0% 53% 8 
Qatar 1.1% 100% 0% 0% 21% 138 
Azerbaijan 0.7% 93% 0% 7% 7% 69 
Bolivia 0.6% 66% 0% 34% 17% 14 
Ecuador 0.5% 100% 0% 0% 1% n.a. 
Angola 0.2% 93% 0% 7% 1% n.a. 
Brunei 0.0% 100% 0% 0% n.a. n.a. 
Sources: BP (2015), IEA (2016). 
3.1 Calculating electricity subsidies 
The way that electricity subsidies are calculated in table 3 is described as follows: 
“electricity reference prices were based on annual average-cost pricing for electricity in 
each country (weighted according to output levels from each generating option). In other 
words, electricity reference prices were set to account for the cost of production, 
transmission and distribution, but no other costs, such as allowances for building new 
capacity. They were determined using reference prices for fossil fuels and annual average 
fuel efficiencies for power generation. An allowance of $15/MWh and $40/MWh was 
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added to account for transmission and distribution costs for industrial and residential 
uses, respectively. To avoid over-estimation, electricity reference prices were capped at 
the levelised cost of a combined-cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plant.”6 
That immediately raises the question of what is the sensible gas price and whether 
it is likely to differ from the reference gas price used in the subsidy estimation. The IEA 
uses export prices for gas exporters, but this seems to exclude the cost of any liquefaction 
or other transport costs and the shadow price of export constraints.7 
For gas-rich countries it is the current cost of extracting and delivering it to the 
power station plus the resource rent, which in many cases of high R/P, will be nearly 
zero. (Another test would be the netback value of gas used to manufacture and export 
fertilizers or LNG, fully accounting for the investment costs needed). However, in some 
of these countries gas extraction costs can be high (most Gulf Monarchies have difficult 
gas geologies and tight gas; Krane, 2015). Finding reliable data on the opportunity cost of 
gas for power is difficult, and evidence is patchy. Thus in 2014 Iran and Oman agreed on 
a gas pipeline to export 350 Bcf/yr to Oman but while Iran expected a price of $11-14 
/mmBtu Oman aimed at $6-8/mmBtu, when European gas prices were then $11/mmBtu 
and in the US $5/mmBtu. Since then spot gas prices have fallen 60% in both these 
markets (Fig 4). In 2013 Saudi Arabia sold domestically at $0.75/mmBtu compared to the 
Henry Hub price of $3.73/mmBtu,8 but this has since been increased to $1.25/mmBTu 
for power production. In the gulf Monarchies (apart from Qatar) extraction costs range 
from $3-9/mmBtu, but in Qatar might be below $1/mmBtu.9 
Egypt typically paid $2.65/mmBtu to foreign operators, considered by them too 
low to develop new fields.  More recently, EGAS has signed deals ranging from $3.95 to 
$5.88/mmBtu but this is for off-shore and deep-water fields that would be considerably 
more costly than on-shore fields. To gain some sense of on-shore gas costs excluding a 
large scarcity rent, the US pre-shale gas prices from 1990- 2000 averaged $(2014) 
3.06/mmBtu ($13.4/MWhth)10 with a standard deviation of $0.73/mmBtu.  
3.2 Gas-fired generation costs 
The costs of generating electricity in a Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) includes 
fuel, other O&M costs and the return on and of the capital cost (capex). To convert from 
gas prices to fuel costs multiply the figures in fig 4 given in $/MWhth by two to give 
                                                 
6 http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energysubsidies/methodology/  
7 The IEA methodology states that “For net exporters, reference prices were based on the export 
parity price: the price of a product at the nearest international hub, adjusted for quality differences 
if necessary, minus the cost of freight and insurance back to the net exporter, plus the cost of 
internal distribution and marketing and any VAT.” This doubly overstates the opportunity cost of 
gas into power stations. 
8 Price data mainly comes from the country fact sheets on the EIA website, http://www.eia.gov/. 
All $ are US$. 
9 Krane (2015) suggests production costs are below $1/mmBtu. 
10 Subscript th refers to the thermal value of the fuel as an input, subscript e to electricity output. 
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$/MWhe. Variable O&M costs of $5/MWh and capex of $22/MWh for a CCGT might 
add $27/MWh (VGB, 2011) to fuel costs. 
As 177 countries have or are likely to sign a climate change agreement arising 
from COP21 in Paris in December 2014, it would be prudent to include a shadow carbon 
price when making electricity investment decisions, and arguably as a target for a 
subsidy-free future electricity price that should guide tariff setting policy. The US 
Government figure of $36/t CO2 cited above is highly sensitive to discount rates, and it is 
unlikely that oil and gas producers would agree (at least initially) prices much above the 
EUA rate of $7/tonne CO2. If a transition price of $10/tonne CO2 is assumed that would 
raise the cost of CCGT generation by $4.5/MWhe.  
That leaves the difficult question of estimating the scarcity value of gas. At the 
very rough lower extraction cost estimates above of $1-3/mmBtu the fuel costs would be 
$8 - 25/MWhe, but this could be below the cost of tight gas, off-shore gas, or even 
pipeline gas, depending on the pipeline transit fee and the way the gas is priced 
(effectively how much monopoly rent the gas producer can extract from its favoured 
location and the extent of competition). 
At $1/mmBTU the gas cost would be $8/MWhe and the total wholesale average 
cost would be $35/MWh without the carbon price and $40/MWh with a $10/t CO2 cost. 
Off-peak power would be $18/MWh, and the peak 25% of hours might be $105/MWh as 
all the capex should be recovered in peak hours. Krane (2015) gives electricity prices to 
industrial customers in 2011 at $30/MWh in Saudi Arabia and Oman (or $15/MWh if the 
IEA’s transmission and distribution (T&D) costs of $15/MWh are reasonable), $40/MWh 
in Bahrain ($25/MWh wholesale), $20/MWh (or $5 wholesale) in Qatar, and less than 
$9/MWh in Kuwait (not even bearing the T&D cost). Former Soviet countries in central 
Europe were notorious for underpricing energy and it is no surprise that industrial 
electricity prices in Ukraine are 6€¢/kWh and to households only 2€¢/kWh.11 
 Given that oil costs would be many times gas costs (and the carbon cost twice as 
high for oil compared to gas) and given that oil would be the peaking fuel in many of 
these countries, there is clearly massive electricity subsidy even if a lower opportunity 
cost of gas is used. Domestic electricity prices are typically even lower than industrial 
prices, despite needing substantially higher T&D costs, explaining the high overall level 
of electricity subsidy.  
3.3 Decarbonising electricity – the cost of renewables 
For the Mid-East and North Africa (MENA), grid-scale solar PV must be an attractive 
low-carbon option, particularly given the coincident air-conditioning load.12 MENA has 
insolation of 1,900-2,300 kWh/m2/yr, while the sunniest part of Germany (Munich) has 
                                                 
11 http://www.differgroup.com/Portals/53/images/Ukraine_overall_final.pdf  
12 In very hot countries there is another peak electric demand in the early evening when cooling is 
needed for night-time comfort and then desert wind may also be blowing more strongly, failing 
which back-up gas-fired generation will be needed. 
13 
 
only 1,200  kWh/m2/yr, and Berlin just over 1,000 kWh/m2/yr.13 One would therefore 
expect PV costs in MENA to be half those in Germany, which has enjoyed massive 
(although heavily subsidized) PV penetration. The costs per peak Watt (Wp) continue to 
fall, and were projected to be $1.43/Wp by 2020 (Brattle, 2015). Fraunhofer ISE (2015) 
forecasts levelised costs in North Africa and Saudi Arabia in 2025 at €¢3-5/kWh ($33-
55/MWh).14 This is directly comparable to the carbon-inclusive levelised cost of CCGT, 
and as it may have a more favourable hourly delivery pattern, it may therefore be even 
more attractive. 
3.4 Reforming electricity subsidies 
Electricity is so valuable that consumers are willing to pay very high prices rather than go 
without. This can be seen in the very high values for estimates of the value of lost load or 
energy unserved, and in the willingness to install diesel generators in countries where 
electricity is unreliable. There is clearly a high willingness and ability to pay, as 
evidenced by the very high costs for off-grid electricity and prices that are comparable to 
OECD levels for grid connected customers in many poor countries, notably in Africa. 
The problem of eliminating electricity subsidies is therefore entirely political – 
Governments fear it would be highly unpopular to remove existing consumer subsidies.  
There are several possible responses to this fear. In some countries electricity 
reliability may be very low, forcing consumers to pay for back-up generation, and 
revealing a willingness to pay for improved reliability (Oseni and Pollitt, 2013). This 
offers the opportunity for the electricity utility to offer improved service for higher tariffs, 
which ideally could be contracted, with those unwilling to move to the higher quality 
service and pay cost-reflective tariffs being selectively disconnected before those with the 
improved contract. Such priority contracts have appealing efficiency properties as well as 
offering an escape from the subsidy dilemma (Chao and Wilson, 1987). 
Whitley and van der Burg (2015) provide supporting evidence of increasing 
willingness to remove fossil fuel subsidies, citing IEA (2014) and an IMF study of 28 
reforms, 12 of which were deemed successful (Clements et al., 2013). Thus Egypt has 
raised fuel prices by 78% and planned to double electricity prices over five years. 
Whitley and van der Burg (2015) note that low oil prices made it easier to remove 
consumption subsidies to oil products. They list a number of principles for reform, 
including “the efficient and visible reallocation of resources to those groups most affected 
through complementary measures. … where possible the best approach is to set 
ambitious goals, with slow, credible and specified timeframes for phasing out subsidies. 
This can include staggering the elimination of subsidies, and ideally should take place as 
part of broader sector or economy-wide reforms as part of a comprehensive approach.”  
                                                 
13 See http://solarelectricityhandbook.com/solar-irradiance.html  
14  Opex €20/kWp, 25 year life for cells, 15 yrs for inverter, 0.2% p.a. degradation, weighted 
average cost of capital, WACC, 5-6% 
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That suggests finding a way to compensate those who would lose from reforming 
subsidies to the extent necessary to overcome entrenched opposition. Saudi Arabia is 
committed to reducing energy and utilities’ subsidies, by $30 billion/year by 2020.15 As 
part of its energy subsidy reform, the Iranian government has increased energy prices on 
several occasions, sometimes dramatically, but a failure to index prices in the face of high 
inflation has reversed these gains. Iran announced in early 2014 that electricity prices 
would increase by 25% and that in 2015 prices would increase again by another 20% to 
reduce subsidies.16 
The standard solution to reforming subsidies while protecting specified groups is 
to provide a specified number of kWh per month per household at the existing price, but 
charge the efficient price for amounts taken above that level. Such increasing block tariffs 
have been used in many countries (California is an example) and the Gulf countries 
including Iran have adopted this strategy, but often failed to have sufficiently high upper 
tiered tariffs. Between 2015 and 2016, Saudi Arabia slightly raised oil prices for power 
generation (but only to $5.87/bbl), considerably raised gas prices for power to 
$1.25/mmBtu and considerably raised the above 2,000 kWh/month block tariff for 
residential electricity (below that it remains at 1.25 US¢/kWh), so that above 6,000 
kWh/month it reaches 8 US¢/kWh (Krane and Hung, 2016, fig 4.). Note that the annual 
average UK residential consumption is less than 4,000 kWh, so these are still 
extraordinarily generous blocks. 
Another strategy has been to raise prices to foreign residents, and Dubai has 
eliminated all electricity subsidies on foreign residents (Krane and Hung, 2016). This 
may make electricity subsidies to nationals more explicit and hence ripe for reform. 
Fixed Transport and Distribution (T&D )costs can be also recovered from higher 
consuming customers per kWh/month up to the fixed T&D cost by offering customers a 
choice of a variable payment of a fixed payment. The size of the subsidized quantum may 
include an element of grandfathering for existing customers, reduced possibly to zero for 
new customers, and ideally reduced each year by a modest amount (e.g. 10%). Similarly, 
the carbon price can be phased in over time as part of the COP 21 reporting requirements. 
(Raising the domestic price of transport fuel to include not just the export parity value but 
also a reasonable road tax charge has higher priority in terms of reducing subsidies and 
restoring budgetary deficits, as figure 3 demonstrates.)  
3. Conclusion 
Energy subsidies in HESEs averaged 4% of GDP in 2014 (table 2), a major contributor to 
budget deficits. While they may have fallen as a share of GDP with falling oil and gas 
prices, so will tax revenues, and hence the budgets of resource rich countries will have 
                                                 
15 Financial Times, 10/4/16. P7. 
16 Business Monitor International (BMI) Research, Iran Power Report Q2 2015, (March 2015), 
page 8. 
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been put under considerable stress. While it is difficult to reform subsidies, the best time 
to start the process is when oil and gas prices have fallen, the attraction of rents to 
potential opposition parties is reduced, and when the absolute level of subsidies may be at 
an historic low. The strategy is to incrementally remove subsidies by linking final prices 
to world market prices, and ideally escalating them in real terms over time. The UK 
successfully moved from almost the lowest gasoline taxes in Europe to the highest by 
raising fuel duties at 3% above the rate of inflation until the prices and taxes were 
deemed acceptable (a balance struck between the Treasury and the people). One of the 
simplest ways of reducing oil subsidies would be to replace oil-fired generation with gas, 
as oil has a world market price and gas should be substantially cheaper. 
In the electricity sector, underpricing was often inherited from past eras when gas 
had a negligible opportunity cost, as the alternative for associated gas was flaring, and a 
failure to index prices to the price index. That combination cumulatively led to 
extraordinarily low current domestic prices and correspondingly excessive electricity 
consumption per $GDP. With gas often now in short supply, no longer a cheap by-
product as associated gas, its opportunity cost has risen, although how high depends on 
whether gas is export-constrained or imported, or requires the development of more 
costly fields. Rough estimates suggest that the wholesale levelised cost of CCGT might 
be $35/MWh without any carbon price and $40/MWh with a $10/tonne CO2 price. To 
this would need to be added transmission and distribution (perhaps $15/MWh for 
industrial customers and up to $40/MWh for households, although the latter could be 
targeted on those of above average consumption). At these costs unsubsidized grid-scale 
solar PV is or shortly should be competitive in high insolation countries, such as the 
many HESEs in North Africa and the Middle East. 
The transition to cost-reflective electricity pricing could start with rising block 
tariffs, in which existing tariffs (indexed at least to retail prices and better, to the export 
price of oil or gas) would be offered for the first number of kWh/month, with rates 
rapidly raised to cost-reflective levels above that. The first tranche could be either 
reduced in volume or raised in price more rapidly than the marginal tariffs, with the aim 
of eliminating subsidies over a modest period, depending on the degree of push-back. 
High electricity prices are politically sustainable in many countries – certainly in 
Germany and Denmark – and past electricity prices in relation to average incomes were, 
at least in inter-war Britain, ten-times current ratios. The problem is not the level, but the 
transition to the efficient level, and designing an acceptable transition should be feasible 
but will need to be done with care.  
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Table A1 Gas data for HESE 
   average production value**  subsidy R/P ‘14  GDP prod/ 
 Country* 2006-14 CV 2014 $bn yrs $bn GDP 
Iran $53.26 20% $55.73 $22.30 197 $425 12.5% 
Libya $4.78 24% $3.95 $0.10 123 $41 11.6% 
Turkmenistan $21.16 27% $22.37 $3.30 252 $48 44.2% 
Venezuela $10.93 16% $9.23 $3.30 195 $381 2.9% 
Uzbekistan $20.46 14% $18.50 $7.10 19 $63 32.7% 
Saudi Arabia $31.87 20% $34.95 $8.30 227 $746 4.3% 
Algeria $29.81 15% $26.90 $3.20 54 $214 14.0% 
Oman $9.61 18% $9.36 $2.50 62 $82 11.7% 
Egypt $20.89 17% $15.73 $1.60 38 $287 7.3% 
Bahrain $4.86 19% $5.46 $0.00 11 $34 14.4% 
Bolivia $5.73 25% $6.92 $0.20 14 $33 17.4% 
Iraq $0.45 37% $0.41 $0.10 2860 $224 0.2% 
Kuwait $4.92 22% $5.29 $1.30 12 $164 3.0% 
Ukraine $9.61 18% $9.36 $3.70 62 $132 7.3% 
Trinidad&Tobago $15.34 13% $13.58 $0.00 8 $29 53.1% 
Indonesia $27.43 14% $23.70 $0.00 39 $889 3.1% 
Qatar $44.28 46% $57.23 $1.60 4 $210 21.1% 
Pakistan $15.09 15% $13.57 $4.50 14 $244 6.2% 
Argentina $14.56 16% $11.44 $4.70 9 $538 2.7% 
Kazakhstan $6.08 20% $6.22 $0.50 78 $218 2.8% 
Russia $212.12 16% $186.87 $17.50 56 $1,861 11.4% 
Azerbaijan $5.02 31% $5.47 $0.70 69 $75 6.7% 
Malaysia $22.79 14% $21.45 $0.00 16 $338 6.7% 
Nigeria $13.07 23% $12.46 $0.10 132 $569 2.3% 
Thailand $12.39 25% $13.60 $0.30 6 $405 3.1% 
Mexico $20.50 12% $18.76 $0.60 6 $1,295 1.6% 
Sources: IEA (2015), BP (2015) 
Notes * Countries ranked in descending order of total subsidies as share of GDP 
** Gas valued at real German import prices  
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Table A2 Electricity and energy data 
  electricity per $(2011) PPP '000 electricity GDP PPP electricity 
  
subsidy  
% GDP 
energy 
kgoe 
electricity 
MWh 
CO2 
tonnes 
cons 
kWh/yr per cap 
Cag % 
p.a. 
Bahrain 4.4% 243 418 452 17,530 $41,932 -2.6% 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 3.9% 185 166 435 2,662 $16,023 4.0% 
Venezuela, RB 3.4% 128 181 377 3,197 $17,690 1.3% 
Kuwait 2.3% 132 210 368 15,552 $74,181 -2.4% 
Turkmenistan 2.3% 370 180 1,072 2,444 $13,555 3.0% 
Uzbekistan 2.2% 284 326 887 1,631 $5,002 -1.0% 
Ukraine 2.1% 306 439 756 3,662 $8,338 0.8% 
Libya 1.9% 139 182 563 3,552 $19,557 0.5% 
Oman 1.9% 160 153 476 5,929 $38,835 5.0% 
Saudi Arabia 1.8% 130 161 381 7,870 $48,963 4.1% 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1.8% 88 169 262 1,701 $10,050 3.4% 
El Salvador 1.8% 88 109 145 857 $7,838 1.4% 
Trin & Tobago 1.4% 478 204 1,248 6,189 $30,390 3.8% 
Algeria 1.4% 94 84 255 1,122 $13,301 5.8% 
Argentina 1.2%       2,901 $3,175 4.0% 
Russian Fed  1.2% 216 275 560 6,486 $23,561 1.0% 
Qatar 1.1% 143 113 328 15,123 $133,395 -0.5% 
Indonesia 0.9% 88 70 260 681 $9,675 6.2% 
United Arab 
Emirates 0.9% 124 170 355 10,537 $62,056 -1.3% 
Pakistan 0.9% 106 102 218 457 $4,476 -1.2% 
Iraq 0.9% 98 89 318 1,341 $15,124 9.2% 
Azerbaijan 0.7% 89 103 232 1,705 $16,593 -2.8% 
Bolivia 0.6% 129 105 286 637 $6,091 4.7% 
Ecuador 0.5% 92 115 237 1,217 $10,626 6.3% 
Bangladesh 0.5% 76 91 144 258 $2,843 6.3% 
Kazakhstan 0.2% 213 218 761 4,893 $22,470 2.0% 
India 0.2% 118 136 355 698 $5,132 5.9% 
Sri Lanka 0.2% 48 48 82 491 $10,242 4.0% 
Mexico 0.1% 96 129 246 2,074 $16,141 1.3% 
Brunei  0.0% 105 123 333 8,657 $70,535 1.9% 
Gabon 0.0% 79 58 83 1,045 $18,172 2.7% 
Malaysia 0.0% 129 176 361 4,114 $23,419 5.7% 
Nigeria 0.0% 142 27 103 149 $5,448 3.5% 
Thailand 0.0% 133 154 332 2,305 $14,943 3.1% 
    
   
  
 
  
High income: non-OECD 149 201 387 6,309 $31,367 1.6% 
Lower middle income 115 126 294 699 $5,527 4.1% 
Middle income 140 190 413 2,716 $17,299 3.5% 
Upper middle income 153 220 473 2,909 $13,201 6.6% 
World   131 216 368 3,021 $13,994 1.9% 
Sources: IEA (2105), World Bank Development Indicators 
Note: Argentina PPP GDP estimated from market prices and Latin American conversion 
to PPPP. 
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Figure A1 Value of oil production and subsidies for selected HESE 
Note: Oil valued at Brent crude prices. Saudi production in 2012 was US$452 billion 
 
 
Figure A2 Production average and variability and subsidies for selected HESE 
Note: Production valued at German gas import prices, Russia average = $212 bn 
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